Continuing with the Iraq war, a debate on the legitimacy of the war would not be complete without discussing the “Downing Street” memo which was leaked and published 
in Britain on May 1, 2005. The memo is actually the minutes of a meeting that took place in the U.K. This meeting was attended by senior ministers of the U.K. government including Tony Blair.
Some key points of the “Downing Street” memo are as followed:
- The Foreign Secretary said he would discuss this with Colin Powell this week. It seemed clear that Bush had made up his mind to take military action, even if the timing was not yet decided. But the case was thin. Saddam was not threatening his neighbors, and his WMD capability was less than that of Libya, North Korea or Iran. We should work up a plan for an ultimatum to Saddam to allow back in the UN weapons inspectors. This would also help with the legal justification for the use of force.
- C reported on his recent talks in Washington. There was a perceptible shift in attitude. Military action was now seen as inevitable. Bush wanted to remove Saddam, through military action, justified by the conjunction of terrorism and WMD. But the intelligence and facts were being fixed around the policy. The NSC had no patience with the UN route, and no enthusiasm for publishing material on the Iraqi regime’s record. There was little discussion in Washington of the aftermath after military action.
- The Prime Minister said that it would make a big difference politically and legally if Saddam refused to allow in the UN inspectors. Regime change and WMD were linked in the sense that it was the regime that was producing the WMD. There were different strategies for dealing with Libya and Iran. If the political context were right, people would support regime change. The two key issues were whether the military plan worked and whether we had the political strategy to give the military plan the space to work.
- The Attorney-General said that the desire for regime change was not a legal base for military action. There were three possible legal bases: self-defense, humanitarian intervention, or UNSC authorization. The first and second could not be the base in this case. Relying on UNSCR 1205 of three years ago would be difficult. The situation might of course change.
So what can we conclude from this official document. Well, we can conclude that both U.K. and the U.S. governments knew that the intelligence was being “fixed” to support Bush’s reason for going to war. We also know from this memo that the Bush administration did little planning in terms of the aftermath of the war which is way we have the growing violence in Iraq now. We also can conclude that the U.K. government knew “Saddam was not threatening his neighbors, and his WMD capability was less than that of Libya, North Korea or Iran.”
Other Documents:
Foreign Secretary Jack Straw Memo — Jack Straw (UK Foreign Secretary) to Tony Blair in preparation for Blair’s visit to Bush’s Crawford ranch, covering Iraq-al Qaida linkage, legality of invasion, weapons inspectors and post-war considerations.
Carne Ross, Britain’s key negotiator at the UN comes clean
This memo should be read by every American. Comments, thoughts??
